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EXAMINING THE ROLE OF LAW OF WAR TRAINING IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Laurie R. Blank* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of 
war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as 
possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the 
study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil 
instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to their 
armed forces and to the entire population.1 
 
As this opening quote from the Geneva Conventions affirms, the drafters of 
the Geneva Conventions, as well as those negotiating earlier law of war treaties, 
understood the essential role that training in the basic rules and principles of 
international law during armed conflict plays in ensuring lawful military operations 
and the protection of those who are vulnerable during wartime. This irreplaceable 
role for training has often failed to garner its due attention, however, in the course 
of the critical emphasis on accountability for international crimes over the past 
twenty-plus years. In effect, neither training nor accountability is sufficient on its 
own to fulfill the core purposes of protecting civilians and mitigating the suffering 
and effects of armed conflict. In tandem, however, these two ends of the spectrum 
of law compliance can form a formidable partnership, reinforcing that 
commanders, soldiers, political leaders and others must take positive and regular 
steps to create an environment that demands adherence to the law, creates the 
conditions for such adherence, and holds accountable those who violate the law. 
The challenges of contemporary conflicts and abuses committed by military 
personnel and members of non-state armed groups in violent conflicts around the 
world emphasize again and again the central importance of the implementation of 
                                                
* © 2017 Laurie R. Blank. Clinical Professor of Law and Director, International 
Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law. I am grateful for outstanding 
research assistance from Christina Zeidan (Emory School of Law, J.D. expected 2018), 
Kyle Hunter (Emory School of Law, J.D. expected 2018) and Zachary Needell (Emory 
School of Law, J.D. expected 2018). 
1 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 144, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
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the law of armed conflict (LOAC) for the protection of combatants, prisoners, 
medical personnel and civilians, as well as cultural and religious landmarks and 
hospitals. The law of armed conflict (LOAC)—otherwise known as the law of war 
or international humanitarian law—governs the conduct of both states and 
individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by 
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means and 
methods of warfare.2 LOAC applies during all situations of armed conflict, 
whether between two or more states, between a state and a non-state group, or 
between two or more non-state groups.3 For international armed conflict, common 
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 states that the Conventions 
“shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war 
is not recognized by one of them.”4 For non-international armed conflict, common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 sets forth minimum 
provisions applicable “in the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”5 
International armed conflicts are governed by the full panoply of LOAC, including 
the four Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I where applicable, and 
customary international law. In contrast, non-international armed conflicts are 
subject to the more limited legal regime of Common Article 3, Additional Protocol 
II where applicable, and the steadily growing customary international law 
                                                
2 See What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Dec. 
31, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8 
BA-YNE9]. The law of armed conflict is codified primarily in the four Geneva 
Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. See sources cited supra 
note 1; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
3 OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF 
WAR 26 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) [hereinafter 
GC IV COMMENTARY] (“Born on the battlefield, the Red Cross called into being the first 
Geneva Convention to protect wounded and sick military personnel. Extending its 
solicitude little by little to other categories of war victims, in logical application of its 
fundamental principle, it pointed the way, first to the revision of the original Convention, 
and then to the extension of legal protection in turn to prisoners of war and civilians. The 
same logical process could not fail to lead to the idea of applying the principle to all cases 
of armed conflict, including internal ones.”). 
4 Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, art. 
2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 2. 
5 Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, art. 1; Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, art. 
3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 1; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 3. 
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applicable in non-international armed conflict, including the principles of military 
necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality.6  
Dissemination and training in LOAC is the direct connection between the 
principles and obligations of the law and the action of military personnel and 
fighters during all types of armed conflict. Calls for dissemination of rules for the 
conduct of war date back at least as far as the ancient Romans, who “announced 
their laws so that no soldier could plead ignorance.”7 In the late nineteenth century, 
during the first wave of law of war treaty codifications and negotiations, the 
preface to the Oxford Manual of 1880 offered an emphatic reminder of why law of 
war training is so important: 
 
It is not sufficient for sovereigns to promulgate new laws. It is essential, 
too, that they make these laws known among all people, so that when a 
war is declared, the men called upon to take up arms to defend the causes 
of the belligerent States, may be thoroughly impregnated with the special 
rights and duties attached to the execution of such a command.8 
 
Disseminating the law of war and training soldiers to fight in accordance with the 
law is thus central to the effective implementation of LOAC. 
Since the Hague Convention in 1899, the law has required soldiers to be 
trained in LOAC. Article I of the 1899 Hague Convention II with Respect to the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land mandated that all “High Contracting Parties 
shall issue instructions to their armed forces which shall be in conformity with the 
‘Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land,’ annexed to the 
present Convention.”9 The modern law of war affirms and reemphasizes the role of 
training and dissemination as a key tool for any law-compliant military. The 
Geneva Conventions mandate that all state parties disseminate information about 
LOAC and provide training to their military personnel to ensure that they 
                                                
6 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 100–27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995) (highlighting the development and applicability of necessity, 
distinction, humanity, and proportionality to internal armed conflict); Abella v. Argentina, 
Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 6 rev. 
¶¶ 176–77 (1997). 
7 William R. Hagan, The Yet-Unpaid Debt of King Gustavus Adolphus: The 
Development of Military Law in Europe During the Cinqueccento, http://www.pegc.us/_ 
LAW_/Hagan_Military_Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95G-X3V9] (citing MATTHEW 
SUTCLIFFE, THE PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS, AND LAWES OF ARMES 303 (1593)). 
8 INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OXFORD MANUAL ON THE LAWS OF WAR ON 
LAND (1880), in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, 
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 37 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 
1988). 
9 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 1, July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1803 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900) [hereinafter Hague II]. 
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understand and are equipped to adhere to their obligations. As the quotation at the 
start of this article notes, states are explicitly required to “include the study [of the 
law] in their programmes of military . . . instruction, so that the principles may 
thereof become known to all their armed forces.”10 In essence, if a military 
“want[s] [its] troops to ‘Fight it Right,’ then [they] must teach them what is 
right.”11 All countries need to ensure that their military personnel receive training 
in LOAC, not only to fulfill their obligations under the Geneva Conventions to 
provide such training, but also to prepare their militaries to apply these rules when 
deployed. In many ways, LOAC “developed as a restraining and humanizing 
necessity to facilitate commanders’ ability to accomplish the military mission even 
in the midst of fear, moral ambiguity, and horrific scenes of violence.”12 
Training is, of course, prospective in nature; it is about taking measures in 
advance of military operations to maximize adherence to the law and minimize 
violations. At the other end of the spectrum lies accountability — efforts after the 
fact to identify, prosecute and punish those responsible for international crimes. As 
in other legal regimes, enforcement and accountability for violations of LOAC are 
key to effective implementation of and adherence to the law. LOAC thus provides 
for individual criminal responsibility for violations; indeed, it was one of the first 
branches of international law to do so. Military justice and disciplinary measures 
date back at least as far as the Roman Empire and, in more modern times, to King 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, whose codification of military justice rules 
“formed a philosophical and structural basis for many of the military codes that 
followed.”13  
Modern LOAC mandates that states take action to prevent and punish serious 
violations of LOAC. Based on the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, the four 
Geneva Conventions require that states 1) provide effective penal sanctions for 
persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions; 2) search for and prosecute or extradite persons alleged to have 
committed or ordered the commission of such crimes; and 3) suppress all other 
violations of the Geneva Conventions. At the same time, it is a well-established 
rule of customary international law that a person can only be convicted of an 
offense on the basis of individual criminal responsibility. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention provides that “no protected person may be punished for an offence he 
or she has not personally committed.”14 Additional Protocols I and II also reaffirm 
                                                
10 Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, 
art. 48; Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 127; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
1, art. 144.  
11 Charles H. B. Garraway, Training: The Whys and Wherefores, 69 SOC. RES. 949, 
949–62 (2002). 
12 Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of Military 
Lawyers, ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 877, 880–81 (2007). 
13 LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 2 (2010). 
14 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 33. 
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this rule,15 as do the military manuals of numerous countries.16 Individual criminal 
responsibility can rest on direct perpetration of a crime or on command or superior 
responsibility stemming from the accused’s role as the superior in a command 
relationship.  
Beginning with Nuremberg and then with the international tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s, the twentieth century brought a 
focus on international criminal responsibility for atrocities, to fill the gap left by 
inadequate or nonexistent national prosecutions in too many conflict situations. In 
the past few decades, there has been an extraordinary development in international 
criminal jurisprudence and options for holding perpetrators accountable for 
atrocities — tribunals for Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court. At the most basic level, 
prosecution of LOAC violations accomplishes the same retributive and deterrent 
effect as prosecution for ordinary domestic crimes: the perpetrator is punished and, 
in most cases, removed from society through incarceration, thus unable to repeat 
his or her crimes. In the area of armed conflict and mass atrocities, accountability 
also serves several broader thematic purposes: 
 
The regular prosecution of war crimes would have an important 
preventive effect, deterring violations and making it clear even to those 
who think in categories of national law that [LOAC] is law. It would also 
have a stigmatizing effect, and would individualize guilt and repression, 
thus avoiding the vicious cycle of collective responsibility and of 
responsibility and punishment at the level of the individual. It shows that 
the abominable crimes of the twentieth century were not committed by 
nations but by individuals. By contrast, as long as the responsibility was 
attributed to States and nations, each violation carried within it the seed 
of the next war. That is the civilizing and peace-seeking mission of 
international criminal law favouring the implementation of [LOAC].17 
 
International criminal responsibility thus forms a critical endpoint to a continuum 
of efforts to regulate the conduct of war and provide protection for both civilians 
and combatants or fighters during armed conflict: training and dissemination, 
implementation, and enforcement. 
This article explores the intersection between training and enforcement in the 
context of international criminal prosecutions. Neither training nor prosecution 
alone can fulfill the crucial need to maximize compliance with the law. Criminal 
                                                
15 Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 75(4); Additional Protocol II, supra note 2, 
art. 6(2)(b). 
16 See 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMMITTEE 
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, r. 102, at 373 (2005) 
[hereinafter CIHL].  
17 1 MARCO SASSÒLI ET AL., INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT 
IN WAR? CASES, DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, Ch. 13, at 44 (3d ed. 2011). 
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prosecution, whether at the national or international level, plays a critical deterrent 
role, but will not be sufficient on its own to ensure protection of civilians. Training 
and other mechanisms for dissemination and education are key tools to ensure 
compliance with the law before and during armed conflict, to help prevent crimes 
from being committed in the first place. In the end, coordinated and concerted 
efforts across the spectrum of LOAC implementation — from training to 
accountability — are essential to promote LOAC’s key objectives: protect 
civilians, minimize unnecessary suffering, and enable effective military operations.  
At a much more specific level, however, training and accountability intersect 
directly in the context of criminal prosecutions where LOAC training — the fact of 
training, the lack of training, or the quality of training — plays a role in the 
prosecution of, or sentencing for, crimes before an international tribunal. Similarly, 
LOAC training has also proven to be relevant in assessing a state’s responsibility 
for violations of LOAC. Although rarely the determinative factor in assessing 
responsibility, LOAC training factors into the accountability and responsibility 
paradigms in several different ways. Understanding how and why LOAC training 
matters in the accountability context is thus one more useful consideration in 
emphasizing the importance and purpose of training. This article analyzes several 
different ways in which LOAC training contributes to the resolution of a 
defendant’s responsibility or sentence. Part I addresses command responsibility 
and the manner in which LOAC training is a key component of each element of 
command responsibility: effective control, knowledge, and measures to prevent or 
punish. Part II examines the role LOAC training or the lack thereof plays in 
sentencing, whether as a mitigating factor or an aggravating factor. Finally, 
although the focus of this analysis is on LOAC training in the context of 
international criminal prosecutions — that is, individual accountability — the final 
section briefly explores issues that arise with respect to the responsibility of the 
state. These issues do not emerge in individual criminal cases but bear directly on 
the obligation to provide training and are therefore relevant in understanding the 
full spectrum of how LOAC training intersects with responsibility: first, the 
contribution that information about LOAC training can make in examining a 
state’s responsibility for alleged violations of LOAC committed by its troops 
during armed conflict; and second, the linkage between LOAC training and a 
state’s obligations under Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
 
II.  COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND LOAC TRAINING 
 
Beyond direct criminal responsibility for war crimes committed pursuant to 
his orders, a commander can face individual criminal responsibility for the failure 
to ensure that his subordinates do not commit violations of LOAC. Command, or 
superior, responsibility is thus a form of liability used in military and international 
law to hold an individual in a leadership position accountable for the actions of his 
subordinates. In essence, command responsibility refers to the commander’s 
liability for the criminal conduct of her underling and is a crucial element of 
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enforcement of LOAC.18 LOAC entrusts commanders with ensuring that their 
subordinates respect and comply with LOAC, including by taking necessary 
measures to prevent or punish subordinates committing violations.19 In all military 
operations, if the commander of an attack or other operation knew or should have 
known of unlawful actions committed by troops or other individuals under his 
control, the commander can be held accountable for such actions. The commander 
is thus held responsible for a sin of omission: the failure to properly supervise and 
control his or her subordinates who committed war crimes or other violations. 
When most crimes are committed by enlisted personnel or low-level officials 
because their superiors failed to prevent such violations, command responsibility 
enables national and international authorities to impose criminal responsibility 
beyond the direct perpetrator. 
Command responsibility is a longstanding rule of customary international 
law,20 in both international and non-international armed conflict, and is codified in 
Additional Protocol I, the Rome Statute, and other treaties, as well as numerous 
military manuals. Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I affirms that the fact that a 
breach of the Conventions of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does 
not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may 
be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude 
in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit 
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to 
prevent or repress the breach.21  
The statutes of the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals use the same formulation,22 
and the Rome Statute presents a more comprehensive codification of the same 
basic rule: 
 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes . . . committed by 
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective 
                                                
18 CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 182 (Cassese et al. eds., 2013). 
19 Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 87. 
20 CIHL, supra note 16, rr. 152–53, at 556–63. 
21 Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 86(2). Article 87 of AP I then sets forth the 
commander’s duty to act, including “to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to 
report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol”; to 
“ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their 
obligations under” the law; and, if the commander “is aware that subordinates or other 
persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a [violation of LOAC], to 
initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations . . . and, where appropriate, to 
initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.” Id. art. 87. 
22 See Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, art. 7(3), S.C. Res. 1877 (July 7, 2009); Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(3), S.C. Res. 1901 (Dec. 16, 2009); Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, art. 6(3), S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
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authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure 
to exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to 
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces 
were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution.23 
 
Command responsibility rests on three essential elements: the existence of a 
superior-subordinate relationship, the fact that the commander knew or should 
have known that crimes were or were about to be committed, and the commander’s 
failure to prevent or punish such violations. As the Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
stated, “under basic principles of command authority and responsibility, an officer 
who merely stands by while his subordinates execute a criminal order of his 
superiors which he knows is criminal violates a moral obligation under 
international law. By doing nothing he cannot wash his hands of international 
responsibility.”24 The existence or lack of training in LOAC has contributed to 
international tribunals’ analysis of each of these three components of command 
responsibility. 
 
A.  Effective Control 
 
The relationship between superior and subordinate is the foundation for 
command responsibility. As the ICTY stated, “[i]t is the position of command over 
the perpetrator which forms the legal basis for the superior’s duty to act, and for 
his corollary liability for a failure to do so.”25 Command authority can be based on 
                                                
23 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 
17, 1998). 
24 United States v. von Leeb (High Command Case), 11 Trials of War Criminals 
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, p. 512 
(1951); see also Trial of General Tomoyaki Yamashita, Case No. 21, Judgment (U.S. Mil. 
Comm’n, Manila Oct. 8, 1945–Dec. 7, 1945), reprinted in 4 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, 
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35 (1945) (convicting General Yamashita 
based on command responsibility because “he failed to provide effective control of [his] 
troops as was required by the circumstances”). 
25 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 359 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-
AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command 
Responsibility, ¶ 16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003); Prosecutor 
v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, ¶¶ 72, 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96, 23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 
¶¶ 394–99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001); Proscutor v. Perisic, 
Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶¶ 86–87, 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
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either de jure status or de facto control and depends on the nature of the control the 
superior exercises over the subordinates. Within the military chain of command, 
command responsibility generally rests on the presumption that a commander has 
the ability and authority to prevent an attack, by giving direct orders not to attack, 
and to punish perpetrators through the imposition of disciplinary measures.26 In the 
context of groups without a formalized command structure or other situations 
lacking evidence of de jure authority, it is important to be able to determine 
accountability based on effective control or de facto authority, to ensure 
enforcement of LOAC against both individual offenders and their superiors.27 The 
language of Article 87 of Additional Protocol I confirms this broad scope of 
command responsibility, reaching beyond commanders and subordinates formally 
assigned to their units. Rather, the treaty provision references both “forces under 
their control” and “other persons under their control,” thus recognizing that the 
duties inherent in the command relationship are not limited to a formal military 
unit relationship or to members of the armed forces more generally, but could 
extend as well to individuals or groups informally operating under their authority.  
Similarly, the Commentary to Additional Protocol I explains that “we are 
concerned only with the superior who has a personal responsibility with regard to 
the perpetrator of the acts concerned because the latter, being his subordinate, is 
under his control. . . . The concept of the superior . . . should be seen in terms of a 
hierarchy encompassing the concept of control.”28 The absence of de jure authority 
does not preclude the imposition of command responsibility; rather, “the influence 
that an individual exercises over the perpetrators of the crime may provide 
sufficient ground for the imposition of command responsibility if it can be shown 
that such influence was used to order the commission of the crime or that, despite 
                                                                                                                       
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement, 
¶¶ 771–74 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Dec. 1, 2003). 
26 Strugar, supra note 25, ¶¶ 395–408. 
27 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 195 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (“The power or authority to 
prevent or to punish does not solely arise from de jure authority conferred through official 
appointment. In many contemporary conflicts, there may be only de facto, self-proclaimed 
governments and therefore de facto armies and paramilitary groups subordinate thereto. 
Command structure, organized hastily, may well be in disorder and primitive. To enforce 
the law in these circumstances requires a determination of accountability not only of 
individual offenders but of their commanders or other superiors who were, based on 
evidence, in control of them without, however, a formal commission or appointment. A 
tribunal could find itself powerless to enforce humanitarian law against de facto superiors 
if it only accepted as proof of command authority a formal letter of authority, despite the 
fact that the superiors acted at the relevant time with all the powers that would attach to an 
officially appointed superior or commander.”). 
28 CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 3544 (1987) [hereinafter 
AP I COMMENTARY]. 
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such de facto influence, the accused failed to prevent the crime.”29 Thus, for 
example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) determined that 
Clément Kayishema, prefect of Kibuye prefecture, had de facto control over 
perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda because, even where his de jure control was 
indeterminate or nonexistent, he instructed and led their attacks, transported them 
to the massacre sites, rewarded them for attacks, and otherwise directed and 
encouraged the attacks.30  
LOAC training plays at most a minor role in the assessment and analysis of 
effective control for the purposes of assigning command responsibility. In the law-
compliant military, LOAC training is one of many manifestations of responsible 
command — commanders are required to ensure that their troops are properly 
trained in the rules and principles of LOAC. In other situations, however, 
inconsistent and improper training of troops may enable the tribunal to confirm the 
commander’s effective control while at the same time condemning the lack of 
effective training.  
For example, the International Criminal Court (ICC) took this approach in the 
case of Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba was the leader of the Mouvement de Libération 
du Congo (MLC) and the commander of the Armée de Libération du Congo, its 
armed wing, and was charged with command responsibility for multiple crimes 
against humanity and war crimes committed on the territory of the Central African 
Republic (CAR) in 2002 and 2003.31 The Trial Chamber details the training and 
dissemination regime Bemba implemented for his troops, including a Code of 
Conduct, and then notes that the very fact of such training and dissemination 
demonstrated that he had sufficient authority to provide appropriate and 
comprehensive training, including a more complete Code of Conduct, that would 
have better equipped his troops to adhere to the law.32 The fact that Bemba 
established such a Code of Conduct, training and dissemination, along with a 
disciplinary system to — at least ostensibly33 — enforce the obligations and rules 
set forth in the Code of Conduct and the training for his troops, therefore was one 
component in demonstrating that he had effective control for purposes of 
                                                
29 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1, Judgement, ¶ 492 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 21, 1999). 
30 Id. ¶¶ 501–04. 
31 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, ¶ 2 (Int’l Crim. Court Mar. 21, 2016) (declaring that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
had “confirmed that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that Mr. Bemba is responsible as a person acting effectively as a military 
commander within the meaning of Article 28(a) for the crimes against humanity of murder, 
Article 7(1)(a), and rape, Article 7(1)(g), and the war crimes of murder, Article 8(2)(c)(i), 
rape, Article 8(2)(e)(vi), and pillaging, Article 8(2)(e)(v), allegedly committed on the 
territory of the Central African Republic (“CAR”) from on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 
March 2003”). 
32 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 65 (Int’l Crim. Court June 21, 2016). 
33 See infra Section I.C. 
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command responsibility. In particular, among the factors the Trial Chamber relies 
on to demonstrate that Bemba retained effective control over MLC forces fighting 
in the CAR — and thus was liable under command responsibility for crimes they 
committed — was the fact that “the MLC Code of Conduct remained applicable to 
the MLC contingent in the CAR throughout the 2002-2003 CAR operation.”34 
Although the Code of Conduct was insufficient in terms of the rules it set forth, the 
crimes it included, and the language in which it was promulgated,35 it nonetheless 
was one demonstration of Bemba’s effective authority and control.  
In addition, a commander cannot use the lack of training or provision of 
insufficient training to undermine or defeat a finding of effective control. The fact 
that Bemba provided or ordered training that was meager at best, incomplete as to 
the rules and fundamental principles underlying them, and in a language requiring 
translation on the spot, did not mean that he could then argue that he did not 
exercise effective control as a way to evade command responsibility. Ten years 
before the Bemba case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued a stern statement regarding situations “where a 
commander intends to use undisciplined soldiers to defend the front lines,” 
reaffirming that command entails responsibility:  
 
Commanders, by virtue of their authority, are qualified to exercise 
control over their troops and the weapons they use, thus ensuring that 
persons and objects afforded protection by international humanitarian 
law are in fact protected. A commander who knows or has reason to 
know that the troops he uses in combat have committed acts prohibited 
by international humanitarian law runs the risk of later being held 
criminally responsible for crimes committed by those troops. If a 
commander uses soldiers while knowing or having reason to know that 
there is a serious risk they will not obey his orders, especially orders to 
comply with international humanitarian law, he may not claim to have 
lacked effective control over them in order to avoid his responsibility 
under Article 7(3) of the Statute. A commander may not exonerate 
himself by claiming to lack effective control if his conduct before the 
crimes were committed demonstrates that he accepted the possibility that 
subsequently he might not be able to control his troops.36  
                                                
34 Bemba, supra note 31, ¶ 703. 
35 Id. ¶¶ 392–93 (explaining that the Code of Conduct provided “that a number of 
‘infractions,’ including ‘murder of a civilian or of some other person’ and ‘abduction and 
rape’ ‘may be punishable by death.’ The Code of Conduct does not provide further details 
as to these ‘infractions,’ for example, the meaning of the phrase ‘some other person,’ the 
distinction between civilians and combatants, or the concept of protected persons. Further, 
it contains no provision prohibiting the crime of pillaging. . . . The Code of Conduct was 
written in French only, and the commanders had the responsibility of translating it into 
Lingala for dissemination, usually orally, to lower ranked soldiers”).  
36 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović & Kubura, IT-01-47-T, Judgement, ¶ 89 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006). 
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B.  Knew or Had Reason to Know 
 
The imposition of command responsibility is not limited to situations where 
the commander has actual knowledge that crimes have been committed or are 
about to be committed by persons under her control, but extends also to situations 
in which the commander had reason to know of such crimes or potential crimes. 
This formulation of constructive knowledge plays an important role to ensure that 
commanders take steps to be aware of what their subordinates are doing and do not 
evade responsibility for willfully ignoring crimes and other disciplinary problems 
that create an environment accepting of or conducive to LOAC violations. 
Additional Protocol I, military manuals, and international jurisprudence use 
slightly different formulations of this concept of constructive knowledge, all 
focused on assigning responsibility in situations where the commander had 
information or access to information that demonstrated the existence of crimes or 
the likelihood such crimes were happening or were about to happen. For example, 
Additional Protocol I assigns command responsibility if a superior “had 
information which should have enabled [him] to conclude in the circumstances at 
the time [that a subordinate was committing or about to commit a violation.]”37 
The ICTY Statute uses “had reason to know” and the Tribunal has held that when 
crimes are widespread, prolonged or receive public attention, such that the 
commander is on notice that such crimes were likely,38 or when “absence of 
knowledge is the result of negligence in the discharge of his duties,”39 the 
commander can be presumed to have had reason to know so as to satisfy the 
standard for command responsibility.  
The Rome Statute imposes command responsibility for military commanders 
who knew or should have known that forces under their control were committing 
or were about to commit violations of LOAC, which is a broader standard than that 
in either Additional Protocol I or the ICTY Statute and is similar to a negligence 
standard.40 Note that the Rome Statute distinguishes between the mental state 
                                                
37 Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 86(2). 
38 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 393 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). 
39 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 332 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); see also Prosecutor v. Baglishema, Case No. ICTR-
96-IA-T, Judgement, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sep. 2, 1998). 
40 The Rome Statute’s formulation matches closely to that used in the trials after 
World War II both at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List 
and Others (Case No. 47) Judgment (U.S. Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, July 8, 1947, to Feb. 19, 
1948), reprinted in VIII LAW REPORTS ON THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34 (1949); 
Yamashita, supra note 25, at 35; von Leeb, supra note 25, at 603. U.S. Army Field Manual 
assigns command responsibility if the commander “has actual knowledge, or should have 
knowledge” of the conduct. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF 
LAND WARFARE ¶ 501 (1956). The UK Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict uses this 
same formulation as well. See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., JSP 383: THE JOINT SERVICE 
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required for command responsibility for military commanders or person acting as a 
military commander and that required for civilian superiors, establishing a higher 
standard that a civilian leader knew or “consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated”41 that subordinates were committing or were about to commit 
LOAC violations. Although the instant analysis focuses on military commanders 
and persons acting effectively as military commanders — the individuals most 
likely to be providing, ordering and supervising training in LOAC and related 
obligations — the distinction serves as a useful reminder of the extent of the 
commander’s more active duty to inform herself of her subordinates’ activities.42  
Tribunals can rely on many sources and types of information to demonstrate 
that the accused knew or had reason to know that forces under his or her 
commander were committing or were about to commit international crimes, 
including direct reports from subordinates, media reports, international 
commission reports and other similar sources. In the context of LOAC training, 
tribunals have used information about training in two primary ways: to 
demonstrate the accused’s knowledge of the rules and principles of LOAC and to 
demonstrate that the accused knew certain troops were not trained in LOAC and 
therefore more likely to commit crimes. Both of these techniques use the fact of 
LOAC training as an important factor in the tribunal’s conclusion that the accused 
meets the mental standard for command responsibility — either that he knew 
crimes were being committed or had been committed, or he knew they were likely 
to be committed given the readiness or lack of readiness in his troops. 
First, an accused’s training in, and thus awareness of, the basic rules and 
principles of LOAC can be sufficient to demonstrate that he knew that certain acts 
constituted crimes. Zlatko Aleksovski was a Bosnian Croat prison commander 
during the armed conflict in Bosnia and was convicted of command responsibility 
for outrages upon personal dignity for the violence inflicted on detainees at the 
Kaonik prison he commanded.43 In assessing whether the accused knew or had 
reason to know that his subordinates were committing crimes, the tribunal 
considered both whether he knew about the acts of violence and whether he knew 
that those acts of violence and mistreatment were violations of the law, that is, 
whether they were prohibited. After dispensing of the first aspect of knowledge, 
the tribunal then pointed to the fact that the accused was aware of basic rules for 
                                                                                                                       
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 16.36 (2004). The U.S. Department of 
Defense Law of War Manual notes that “the commander’s personal dereliction must have 
contributed to or failed to prevent the offense.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 
¶ 18.23.3.2 (2015). 
41 Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 28(2)(a). 
42 Kayishema, supra note 29, ¶ 227 (highlighting this distinction in the Rome Statute). 
43 Aleksovski, supra note 25, ¶ 228 (“[T]he violence in question constitutes an 
outrage upon personal dignity and, in particular, degrading or humiliating treatment within 
the meaning of Common Article 3 of the Conventions and therefore constitutes a violation 
of the laws or customs of war within the meaning of Article 3 of the Statute for which the 
accused must be held responsible under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Tribunal’s Statute.”). 
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treatment of prisoners, including those set forth in LOAC. Specifically, the tribunal 
found that  
 
[g]iven his training and previous experience at Zenica prison, the 
accused could not have been unacquainted with the rules relative to the 
treatment of prisoners and conditions of detention. He had also admitted 
having knowledge of the Geneva Conventions and their contents. The 
Trial Chamber therefore finds on the basis of the evidence tendered at 
trial that the accused knew that crimes were being committed in Kaonik 
prison.44 
 
In effect, because he received training in LOAC and in other rules regarding 
treatment of detainees, he knew or had reason to know that the acts of which he 
was aware were crimes, thus meeting the requirement for command responsibility 
that he know or have reason to know that his subordinates are committing or have 
committed crimes. 
Second, the fact that a commander provides training in LOAC can also 
demonstrate that he knew or had reason to know that forces under his command 
are committing or are likely to commit crimes. Enver Hadžihasanović was the 
commander of the 3rd Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
subsequently Chief of Staff of the Army, and was charged with command 
responsibility for numerous war crimes during the conflict between Bosnian forces 
and Croat forces in 1993 and 1994, including murder, cruel treatment, wanton 
destruction, plunder, and willful damage to religious institutions.45 The training 
regimen that he established for his regular troops played a significant role in the 
tribunal’s analysis of the knowledge requirement for command responsibility. In 
the course of his tenure as commander of the 3rd Corps, Hadžihasanović 
“organised the distribution of the Geneva Conventions and drew his troops’ 
attention to the obligations they entailed,”46 created a Legal Department,47 and 
trained “his troops in military discipline, which implied respecting orders.”48 
Military police units within the 3rd Corps also received “instruction on respect for 
the Geneva Conventions and obligations stemming from the laws of war.”49  
In effect, the tribunal demonstrated that the accused knew that training was an 
essential component of military preparedness and adherence to fundamental legal 
obligations. Some of the crimes for which Hadžihasanović was charged, however 
were committed by mujahedin units that were incorporated into the 3rd Corps and 
then had responsibility for one or more detention centers. As in all cases of 
command responsibility, the tribunal had to be satisfied that the accused knew or 
                                                
44 Id. ¶ 114. 
45 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, supra note 36, ¶ 11. Hadžihasanović was convicted, 
based on command responsibility, for murder and cruel treatment. Id. at 620–25. 
46 Id. ¶ 857. 
47 Id. ¶ 858. 
48 Id. ¶ 859. 
49 Id. ¶ 883. 
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had reason to know that subordinates under his command were committing or were 
likely to commit crimes. Having highlighted the training Hadžihasanović 
established for the regular troops and the military policy in the 3rd Corps, the 
tribunal then noted that there was “no indication that, as from when the El 
Mujahedin detachment was integrated into the . . . 3rd Corps on 13 August 1993, 
the Accused Hadžihasanović promoted the teaching and dissemination of 
international law among the troops of that detachment.”50 Concluding that he 
“could therefore not been unaware of the detachment’s lack of training in 
customary international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols,”51 the tribunal found that Hadžihasanović was “on notice of 
the real and present risk that the mujahedin were about to commit criminal acts 
similar to those they had already carried out on several occasions in similar 
circumstances.”52 The provision of training to one group under his command and 
the conspicuous absence of training provided to another group also under his 
command was sufficient to determine that he knew or had reason to know in 
accordance with the required mental state for command responsibility. 
 
C.  Available and Necessary Measures to Prevent or Punish Violations 
 
Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I obliges commanders and other 
superiors to take all feasible measures to prevent or repress war crimes and other 
LOAC violations. Indeed, it is the affirmative duty in Article 87 that forms the 
foundation for command responsibility — commanders are under a duty to control 
the acts of their subordinates and to prevent or repress violations of the Geneva 
Conventions or Additional Protocol I. As the Commentary to Additional Protocol 
explains, “the first duty of a military commander . . . is to exercise command” and 
Article 87 mandates that “the control of the application of the Conventions and the 
Protocol [be] part of the duties of military commanders.”53 The failure to exercise 
this duty is the omission that triggers international criminal responsibility. Thus, if 
commanders “refrain from taking the requisite measures [to prevent abuses], or if, 
having taken them, they do not ensure their constant and effective application, they 
fail in their duties and incur responsibility.”54 Similarly, a commander who is 
aware of violations and takes no steps to prevent further breaches has also failed to 
fulfill his obligations.  
The types of measures a commander is expected to take range across the 
spectrum of LOAC implementation and enforcement, from training in accordance 
                                                
50 Id. ¶ 1434. 
51 Hadžihasanović, supra note 36, ¶ 1434. 
52 Id. ¶ 1435; see also id. ¶ 1456 (“[H]e knew that there was a risk that the mujahedin 
had not been punished for [earlier] crimes and that they had not had the benefit of any 
training in international humanitarian law. Consequently, on 20 October 1993, he had 
reason to know that his subordinates were preparing to commit the crimes of murder and 
mistreatment against their prisoners.”). 
53 AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 28, ¶¶ 3549, 3552. 
54 Id. ¶ 3548. 
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with LOAC, to orders mandating lawful action and prohibiting unlawful acts, and 
finally to the imposition of disciplinary and criminal authority over those who 
violate such orders and LOAC. In examining the extent of this duty, the 
jurisprudence of the international tribunals focuses on the duty to take necessary 
and reasonable measures — which are necessarily limited by what is possible in 
the circumstances at the time. As the ICTY held, it is important to recognize “that 
international law cannot oblige a superior to perform the impossible. Hence, a 
superior may only be held criminally responsible for failing to take such measures 
within his powers . . . [or] within his material possibility.”55 Giving orders to halt 
indiscriminate shelling or other unlawful attacks on protected persons or objects, 
for example, falls directly within a commander’s power, as does action to hold 
accountable those who engaged in such unlawful attacks or failed to prevent 
them.56 Indeed, the ability of a superior to exercise authority over subordinates in 
any manner will suffice to attach an obligation to take reasonable measures to 
prevent violations. For example, the authority to hire and fire employees 
consequently means that such superior has the ability to “remov[e], or threaten[] to 
remove, an individual from his or her position . . . if he or she was identified as a 
perpetrator of crimes.”57  
Training and dissemination can figure prominently in the analysis of whether 
a commander took available and necessary measures to prevent violations from 
occurring. The very essence of command involves the obligation to “ensure that 
[subordinates] act within the dictates of international humanitarian law and that the 
laws and customs of war are therefore respected.”58 There can be little doubt that 
instructing one’s troops in the basic principles and rules of LOAC is an essential 
and necessary preventative measure to protect against violations of the law during 
armed conflict. International tribunals have focused on two particular aspects of 
training in the context of this element of failure to take necessary measures to 
prevent crimes: first, the absence of training as an example of a necessary measure 
that was not taken; and second, the existence and provision of training as a 
demonstration that the commander in fact has the ability to take preventive 
measures and that such measures are available. For example, the ICTY detailed a 
number of measures that Zdravko Mucić, the commander of the Čelebići prison 
camp, could and should have taken to prevent the crimes committed in that camp. 
In particular, the tribunal highlighted testimony by one witness who noted that “an 
important gap in any preventive efforts made by [his co-accused] is that he as 
commander never gave any instructions to the guards as to how to treat the 
detainees.”59 As a result, the tribunal found that he failed to make the necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent crimes. 
                                                
55 Delalić, supra note 38, ¶ 395. 
56 See Strugar, supra note 25, ¶¶ 421, 444. 
57 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement, ¶ 880 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Rwanda Jan. 27, 2000). 
58 Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgement, ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005). 
59 Id. ¶ 773. 
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The ICC and the ICTY’s convictions of Bemba and Hadžihasanović offer 
useful examples of how the provision of training, however insufficient or episodic, 
affirms a commander’s ability to take necessary measures — and how such poor 
training then proves the failure to take such measures. When Hadžihasanović 
provided substantial training in LOAC generally and the Geneva Conventions 
specifically to his regular troops in the 3rd Corps, but no such training at all to the 
mujahedin he used for any number of military operations and prison camps, the 
ICTY appropriately concluded that not only did he have the capacity to provide 
such training and the knowledge of the need for and value of such training, but that 
the lack of such training demonstrated a failure to take necessary measures. Thus, 
“even though international humanitarian law forbade him from using those troops 
in combat operations so long as he had not received assurances that they had 
received training in customary international humanitarian law, the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol, . . . the Accused Hadžihasanović allowed, or 
even created, all of the conditions conducive to the repeated commission of 
crimes.”60  
Similarly, rather than view Bemba’s attempts to provide training and a Code 
of Conduct, meager as they were, as a sign of his good faith efforts to exercise 
reasonable command, the ICC held that they demonstrated “the means at Mr 
Bemba’s disposal to take measures to prevent and repress crimes.”61 As a result, 
given “his extensive material ability to prevent and repress the crimes,” the 
accused could have added to or improved his insufficient measures with steps 
including, “inter alia, (i) ensur[ing] that the MLC troops in the CAR were properly 
trained in the rules of international humanitarian law, and adequately 
supervised.”62 First, the tribunal found that the steps he did take, including the 
training, the Code of Conduct, and warnings to his troops in the CAR not to attack 
civilians, however ineffective, demonstrated that he “had the authority and ability 
to take measures to prevent and repress the commission of crimes.”63 Providing 
some training therefore shows that a commander has the ability to provide better 
and more effective training. Second, the tribunal reaffirms that training works to 
prevent crimes. Its analysis of the evolution of Bemba’s troops operations and 
crimes showed that “clear training, orders, and hierarchical examples indicating 
that the soldiers should respect and not mistreat the civilian population would have 
reduced, if not eliminated, crimes motivated by a distrust of the civilian 
population, as enemies or enemy sympathisers.”64 Finally, building on these two 
initial conclusions, the tribunal determines that the inconsistent and often minimal 
training, as well as the incomplete and often incorrect Code of Conduct, proved to 
be direct evidence of Bemba’s failure to take necessary measures to prevent 
                                                
60 Hadžihasanović, supra note 36, ¶ 1483. Indeed, the tribunal notes that, by doing so, 
“he risked being incapable of taking the necessary and reasonable measures that might be 
required.” Id. 
61 Bemba, supra note 32, ¶ 65. 
62 Bemba, supra note 31, ¶ 729. 
63 Id. ¶ 738. 
64 Id. ¶ 739. 
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crimes.65 His failure to remedy the deficiencies in training, both before deployment 
and after receiving reports of crimes committed in the CAR, to provide more 
training, and to ensure clear orders and instructions in the Code of Conduct, 
directly contributed to the commission of the crimes. Effective and comprehensive 
training is the natural first step in carrying out the obligation to take necessary 
measures to prevent violations of LOAC — and the incorporation of information 
about the existence and quality of such training has proved to be a useful tool in 
assessing the responsibility of commanders for the violations committed by their 
subordinates. 
 
III.  SENTENCING AND LOAC TRAINING 
 
Sentencing at the international tribunals encompasses a wide range of legal, 
normative, political and procedural issues, ranging from the fundamental purposes 
of punishment in the criminal law to the need for consistency across sentencing 
procedures and rules for the types of considerations that can be addressed in 
reaching a final sentencing decision. LOAC training touches on sentencing only at 
the margins, in the context of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. As a result, 
the general philosophical, procedural and normative considerations in sentencing 
remain outside the scope of this article. Although efforts to present LOAC training, 
or the lack thereof, as a mitigating or aggravating circumstance have been few and 
far between, tribunals have considered how training might play a role in assessing 
the appropriate punishment for perpetration of or participation in international 
crimes. At present, no tribunal has applied an aggravating circumstance related to 
LOAC training, although the ICTY did raise the possibility in Prosecutor v. 
Obrenović. Reaffirming the leadership obligations and role of commanders, the 
ICTY implied that a commander’s failure to live up to his or her “duty, which 
stems from [his or her] position, training, and leadership skills, to set an example 
for their troops that would promote the principles underlying the laws and customs 
of war”66 and thereby encourage or even promote the commission of crimes, could 
be an aggravating circumstance.  
LOAC training has appeared on a few occasions with regard to mitigating 
circumstances, in contrast. Interestingly, there does not yet seem to be any 
consensus view on how LOAC training should factor into any consideration of 
mitigating circumstances, and the cases produce varying results, primarily 
depending on the role and authority of the accused. For example, Esad Landžo was 
nineteen years old at the time he was a guard at the Čelebići prison camp. In 
determining his sentence for murder, torture and cruel treatment, the tribunal 
considered several mitigating circumstances, including his lack of knowledge 
regarding the norms and principles of LOAC. In particular, one of the three 
                                                
65 Id. ¶¶ 736–37. 
66 Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 100 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003). The Trial Chamber declined to 
find such an aggravating circumstance for Obrenović. 
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primary factors the tribunal noted explicitly was that “he had no proper military 
training or instruction in how to comport himself in relation to detainees such as 
those in the Čelebići prison-camp.”67 Perhaps as a reminder of the important role 
of leadership in disseminating LOAC, the fact that he had not been taught either 
the principles to guide his behavior or the tactical procedures that comported with 
the law weighed in his favor as the tribunal assessed the appropriate sentence for 
his crimes. 
For commanders and others in positions of leadership, even low-level or de 
facto leadership, the foundational obligation to promote and ensure compliance 
with the law appears to drive how tribunals consider the value of LOAC training as 
a mitigating circumstance. Bemba argued that his implementation of training and 
dissemination of a Code of Conduct was a mitigating circumstance because most 
other commanders and superiors charged with command responsibility for 
international crimes were found to have taken no action to prevent such crimes or 
had deliberated, promoted, or even participated in such crimes.68 The tribunal, 
however, took a different view, finding that 
 
such minimal and inadequate measures, as well as the incomplete Code 
of Conduct, deficiencies in its dissemination, uneven training regime, 
and the MLC disciplinary system, demonstrate the means at Mr Bemba’s 
disposal to take measures to prevent and repress crimes. Such ability 
underscores Mr Bemba’s superior failures.
 
They do not reduce his 
culpability or justify mitigation.69  
 
The commander’s duty is not satisfied with measures that simply do lip service to 
the obligations of responsible command, so mediocre, insufficient or ineffective 
measures provide no basis for mitigation on the grounds of providing LOAC 
training and dissemination. 
In contrast, good faith efforts at and demonstrations of responsible command 
in the context of training or dissemination of the law will be taken into account as a 
possible or actual mitigating circumstance. The ICTY assessed precisely these 
considerations as personal mitigating factors in sentencing Hadžihasanović on 
grounds of command responsibility for murder and cruel treatment. Thus, the fact 
that  
 
he worked to enforce the rules of international humanitarian law to 
protect Croatian people and property, be it through his calls to respect the 
law, or through the training sessions on the principles of international 
humanitarian law that he organised for 3rd Corps soldiers and officers70  
                                                
67 Delalić, supra note 38, ¶ 1283. 
68 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3376-Conf, Public Redacted 
Version of Submissions on Sentence ¶¶ 68–72 (April 26, 2016). 
69 Bemba, supra note 32, ¶ 65. 
70 Hadžihasanović, supra note 36, ¶ 2080. 
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contributed directly to the tribunal’s conclusion that he had “a character which can 
be rehabilitated and . . . thus merits a reduced sentence.”71 Although 
Hadžihasanović fell short in mandating training for the mujehadin and therefore 
failed to take the necessary measures to prevent crimes committed by those 
subordinates, as discussed above, the tribunal did consider and give weight to his 
overall commitment to disseminating LOAC and requiring training for his regular 
troops as a personal or reputational consideration. 
 
IV.  THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND LOAC TRAINING 
 
Beyond the role that LOAC training can play or has played in assessing 
individual criminal responsibility or sentencing in international criminal 
prosecutions, a brief examination of two other ways in which LOAC training is 
relevant to LOAC responsibility determinations is useful. In particular, as set forth 
in the introduction above, the primary obligation for training and dissemination of 
LOAC and for promoting and mandating adherence to the law lies with the state. 
Within this framework, the approach of two adjudicatory mechanisms to how 
training in the fundamental principles and obligations of LOAC may affect a 
state’s responsibility for violations committed by its own troops or other forces it is 
supporting provides an interesting companion to the individual accountability 
analysis. Indeed, on some level, the conclusions in these two instances mirrors the 
overall approach to individual accountability with respect to the importance and 
role of ensuring appropriate training and dissemination of LOAC. 
When faced with allegations of failing to respect LOAC in the face of 
violations, a state will understandably point to its program of training and 
instruction in LOAC to demonstrate its commitment to this essential body of law. 
In the arbitration of claims after the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
both states relied on evidence of training in LOAC, specifically with respect to 
treatment of prisoners of war, for exactly this purpose. Among numerous claims 
under both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 
heard claims from both states regarding mistreatment and killing of prisoners of 
war.72 In the final determination of responsibility, the Claims Commission found 
Eritrea responsible both for failing to protect against unlawful killing and for 
permitting abusive treatment of prisoners at or shortly after the point of capture.73 
With regard to Ethiopia’s responsibility, the Claims Commission similarly 
assigned responsibility for beatings and other abusive treatment of prisoners at the 
time of capture, but not for killing of prisoners.74 One key difference for the 
                                                
71 Id. 
72 See Partial Award on Prisoners of War (Eritrea’s Claim 17), 42 I.L.M. 1083 (Eri.-
Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003) [hereinafter Eritrea’s Claim 17]; Partial Award on Prisoners of 
War (Ethiopia’s Claim 4), 42 I.L.M. 1056 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003) [hereinafter 
Ethiopia’s Claim 4]. 
73 Ethiopia’s Claim 4, supra note 72, ¶ 68. 
74 Eritrea’s Claim 17, supra note 72, ¶¶ 59–63. 
2017] LAW OF WAR TRAINING 767 
Commission: the provision and, most importantly, the effectiveness of LOAC 
instruction and training regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. 
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea provided such training. As the Commission noted, 
“Ethiopia presented substantial evidence regarding the international humanitarian 
law training given to its troops.”75 Similarly,  
 
Eritrea offered detailed and persuasive evidence that Eritrean troops and 
officers had received extensive instruction during their basic training, 
both on the basic requirements of the Geneva Conventions on the taking 
of POWs and on the policies and practices of the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (“EPLF”) in the war against the prior Ethiopian 
government, the Derg, for independence, which had emphasized the 
importance of humane treatment of prisoners.76 
 
Notwithstanding that training, there was evidence of extensive and repeated 
beatings and other mistreatment of prisoners on both sides, and both states were 
held responsible for that mistreatment. The difference — and the impact of training 
— ultimately lay in the analysis of the claims of killing of prisoners. The 
Commission heard evidence of recurring and widespread killing of Ethiopian 
prisoners by Eritrean troops, but only isolated such killings of Eritrean prisoners by 
Ethiopian troops.77 In reaching opposite determinations regarding the two states’ 
respective responsibilities, the Commission relied not only on the existence of 
training, but on information demonstrating the effectiveness of that training. Thus, 
with regard to Eritrea, the Commission found no “evidence of . . . steps Eritrea 
took, if any, to ensure that its forces actually put this extensive training to use in 
the field,”78 and the reports of regular and repeated killings of prisoners 
corroborated that conclusion. 
In contrast, Ethiopia’s training proved effective in this regard — not only in 
protecting prisoners from unlawful killing, but also in demonstrating that Ethiopia 
should not be held responsible for the isolated violations that did occur. 
Highlighting that “several Eritrean [prisoner of war] declarants described 
occasions when Ethiopian solders threatened to kill Eritrean [prisoners] at the front 
or during evacuation, but either restrained themselves or were stopped by their 
comrades,” the Commission determined that the “accounts of capture and its 
immediate aftermath presented to the Commission . . . suggest that [Ethiopia’s] 
training generally was effective in preventing unlawful killing, even ‘in the heat of 
the moment’ after capture and surrender.”79 The fact of LOAC training and 
whether such training worked, even if not perfectly, was decisive in assessing the 
responsibility of both states. The approach to state responsibility thus emphasizes 
                                                
75 Id. ¶ 60. 
76 Ethiopia’s Claim 4, supra note 72, ¶ 67. 
77 Id. ¶ 66; Eritrea’s Claim 17, supra note 72, ¶ 59. 
78 Ethiopia’s Claim 4, supra note 72, ¶ 67. 
79 Eritrea’s Claim 17, supra note 72, ¶ 60. 
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the same considerations as seen above in individual accountability: providing not 
only training, but effective training, is an essential obligation and an important 
consideration in determining responsibility. 
Finally, the converse can also be true — training or dissemination that 
includes instructions at odds with LOAC’s fundamental rules and principles is, in 
and of itself, a violation of LOAC. Although there have been no international 
criminal prosecutions raising this question, perhaps because evidence of such 
training or instruction would likely bear directly on direct criminal responsibility 
for the acts in question, the International Court of Justice did address it in 
Nicaragua v. U.S. In the course of tackling the overarching issues of self-defense 
and intervention, the Court also addressed potential LOAC violations. Although it 
determined that it could not impute violations by the contras to the United States,80 
the Court identified one particular violation of LOAC by the United States: the 
obligation to respect and ensure respect for LOAC under Common Article 1 of the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949.81 Noting that this obligation “derive[s] not only 
from the Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian 
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression,”82 the Court held 
that the United States was under an obligation not to encourage violations of 
Common Article 3, the relevant applicable framework to the conflict in Nicaragua. 
Unlike above, where training was presented as evidence of a commitment to 
LOAC for the purposes of minimizing or eliminating responsibility, here, the 
training and instruction that the United States provided to the contras in military 
operations and the applicable rules was the actual violation. In 1983, the United 
States had disseminated several thousand copies of a Psychological Operations in 
Guerrilla Warfare, a Central Intelligence Agency training manual, that, “while 
expressly discouraging indiscriminate violence against civilians, considered the 
possible necessity of shooting civilians who were attempting to leave a town”83 
and advised in favor of “neutralizing” local judges and officials for propaganda 
purposes. Finding that the publication and dissemination of the manual was “an 
encouragement . . . to commit acts contrary to general principles of international 
humanitarian law,” the Court held that the United States had thus violated its 
obligation to respect and ensure respect for LOAC. In effect, training that allowed 
for or promoted conduct prohibited under LOAC — attacks on civilians, in this 
case — ran directly counter to the state’s obligation under both treaty and 
customary law to respect and promote respect for the law. 
                                                
80 Military and Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 115, 216 (June 27). 
81 Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, art. 1; Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, art. 
1; Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 1; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 1 
(“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances.”); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 1(1). 
This rule is also recognized as customary international law. CIHL, supra note 16, at Rule 
139. 
82 Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 80, ¶ 220. 
83 Id. ¶¶ 117, 122. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Training and dissemination of the fundamental rules and principles of LOAC 
is the first step in any process to ensure lawful military operations. A soldier, a 
military unit, an entire military must know the rules and parameters for 
appropriate, lawful and effective action during armed conflict. In the same manner, 
accountability for violations of LOAC — whether individual criminal 
accountability or state responsibility — is an equally essential tool for enforcing 
the law. Exploring the intersection between these two endpoints of the spectrum of 
LOAC implementation highlights how training and accountability can actually 
work together to maximize each one’s effectiveness. The way in which 
information about training contributes to accountability under command 
responsibility is a strong reinforcement of the message that commanders must 
ensure that their troops are properly trained in LOAC and that such training is 
effective and provided to all troops, regular or irregular. A commander’s 
commitment to providing training can also be evidence of his or her good character 
for purposes of mitigation. And a state’s failure to implement a regular and 
effective program of training and instruction can help determine its responsibility 
for regular or repeated abuses by its troops. 
Overall, the fundamental message is that LOAC training is not a box to be 
checked on a long to-do list before military deployment. The lesson from 
international cases addressing LOAC training in the context of both individual and 
state responsibility is that LOAC training must be ongoing, regular and proactive 
— the central consideration is not simply that military personnel are trained in 
LOAC, but that those personnel adhere to LOAC. Inadequate or inconsistent 
training does not meet that threshold, as Bemba discovered in his judgment and 
sentencing. Comprehensive training for regular troops but not irregulars is also not 
sufficient, as Hadžihasanović’s conviction based on command responsibility for 
the crimes of the mujahedin demonstrated. No less, training that is regular and 
even comprehensive but does not produce the proper behavior also falls short, as 
the different conclusions regarding Eritrea and Ethiopia’s responsibility for killings 
of prisoners of war manifests. LOAC is not a regime of passivity, but demands 
affirmative action to educate about, comply with, and enforce the law. Indeed, the 
intersection between training and accountability highlights that no commander, no 
state, and no soldier can be a bystander, but rather must take the necessary steps to 
ensure that anyone under her command or acting on its behalf is equipped and 
dedicated to applying the law. 
